Denver Journal of International Law & Policy
Volume 13
Number 2 Winter
Symposium - Human Rights

Article 12

January 1984

Ocean Dumping
John Warren Kindt

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp

Recommended Citation
John Warren Kindt, Ocean Dumping, 13 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 335 (1984).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

Ocean Dumping
JOHN WARREN KINDT*
Man is both creature and molder of his environment, which gives him physical sustenance and affords him the opportunity for intellectual, moral, social
and spiritualgrowth. In the long and tortuous evolution of the human race on
this planet a stage has been reached when, through the rapid acceleration of
science and technology, man has acquired the power to transform his environment in countless ways and on an unprecedented scale. Both aspects of man's
environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being
and to the enjoyment of basic human rights-even the right to life itself.
Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment (1972).'

I.

INTRODUCTION

The oceans are the earth's greatest single natural resource. Covering
71 percent of the earth's surface, they are crucial to maintaining the balance of the global ecosystem. "The importance of the oceans needs little
emphasis as this planet's last great economic frontier, the potential source
for enormous food supplies, the final buffer against ecological catastrophe,
and a recreational outlet for restoration of body and spirit of man."'
As important as the oceans are to mankind, it seems irrational that
human enterprise would abuse them.3 Man's dumping of wastes into the
ocean has always occurred. However, due to accelerating industrial development and population growth, the quantities and concentrations of
wastes dumped have begun to tax the assimilative capacity of the oceans.4
The reasons for the growing use of the ocean as a dump site are readily observable because mankind tends to "regard the oceans as a convenient, limitless receptacle for wastes."'5 "But as problems of waste disposal
on land multiply, pressures to use the oceans as a dumping ground become stronger." Ocean dumping often provides the least expensive
*Professor, University of Illinois; A.B. 1972, William & Mary; J.D. 1976, MBA 1977,
University of Georgia; LL.M. 1978, SJD 1981, University of Virginia.
1. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, art. I, proclamation 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 3 (rev. ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Stockholm Report]. For a copy of the unrevised edition of the Stockholm Report, see UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, THE RESULTS FROM STOCKHOLM 1, 70
(E. Verlag ed. 1973).
2. Waldichuk, Control of Marine Pollution:An Essay Review, 4 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.
269, 291 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Waldichuk].
3. Id. at 282.
4. Lumsdaine, Ocean Dumping Regulation: An Overview, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 753, 753
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Lumsdaine].
5. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVTL. QuALrrY-1980 15 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
CEQ 1980 REPORT].

6. Id.
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method of disposal. Since the sites are far removed from land, the adverse
effects are less noticeable and therefore less objectionable.' However, experience and research have revealed that despite its vastness, the ocean's
natural ability to accept, decompose, and recycle wastes is limited." Once
saturation levels of waste assimilation develop, irreversible consequences
may result, for the "deep sea has a turnover rate measured in thousands
of years." 9
Of the pollutants entering the world's oceans, approximately 10 percent are due to direct ocean dumping.'0 In 1970 the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) identified seven sources of ocean dumping."
The seven categories and their definitions are as follows:
a. "Dredge spoils-the solid materials removed from the bottom
of water bodies generally for the purpose of improving navigation:
sand, silt, clay, rock, and pollutants that have been deposited from
municipal and industrial discharges.""
b. "Industrial wastes-acids; refinery, pesticides, and paper mill
wastes; and assorted liquid wastes.""11
c. "Sewage sludge-the solid material remaining after municipal
waste treatment: residual human wastes and other organic and inorganic wastes.""
d. "Construction and demolition debris-masonry, tile, stone,

plastic, wiring, piping, shingles, glass, cinderblock, tar, tarpaper, plaster, vegetation, and excavation dirt.""'
e. "Solid waste-more commonly called refuse, garbage, or
trash-the material generated by residences; commercial, agricultural,
and industrial establishments; hospitals and other institutions; and
municipal operations: chiefly paper, food wastes, garden wastes, steel
and glass containers, and other miscellaneous materials. '"'6
f. Explosives and chemical munitions-no official definition but

includes "[u]nserviceable or obsolete shells, mines, solid rocket fuels,
and chemical warfare agents.""
g. "Radioactive wastes-the liquid and solid wastes that result

from processing of irradiated fuel elements, nuclear reactor opera-

7. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 754.
8. CEQ 1980 REPORT, supra note 5, at 15.
10. Note, The Ocean Dumping Dilemma, 10 LAW. AM. 868, 877 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Dumping Dilemma].
11. CouNcE

oN ENvTL. QuALrry, OCEAN DUMPING 18 (Report to the President, 1970)

[hereinafter cited as OCEAN DUMING REPORT]. These seven categories remain unchanged in
the CEQ 1980 REPORT, supra note 5, at 17.
12. OCEAN DUMPING REPORT, supra note 11, at iv.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 6.
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tions, medical use of radioactive isotopes, and research activities and
from equipment and containment vessels which become radioactive by
induction."' 8
These sources are listed in decreasing order of their deleterious impact on the marine environment.'" Of the 10 percent of ocean dumped
materials, dredged spoils constitute 80 percent of this total."0 Approximately 1 to 10 percent of the dredged sediment taken from waterways
and harbors has been contaminated to potentially unacceptable levels because of industrial, urban, and agricultural activities.2 ' Even non-toxic
dredged spoils can physically damage marine organisms in ways ranging
from inhibiting the penetration of light (due to suspended sediments) to
smothering organisms on the ocean floor when large quantities are
dumped. 2
The dumping of dredged material, sewage sludge, and other wastes
has had a measurable impact on ecosystems, such as the New York Bight,
and has led to cadmium and PCB concentrations that have approached
intolerable levels. 3 Toxic pollutants dumped into the ocean, either industrial wastes or municipal sewage sludge, enter into the tissue of marine
organisms. As larger forms feed on contaminated organisms, toxic substances accumulate and reach concentrations where immediate physical
harm can occur to marine mammals, birds, and man.2 4 For example, biomagnification 2 5 of PCB's in marine food chains has been reported, and
levels involving birds and mammals have been magnified "by a factor on
the order of 10 to 100 at each step.

'26

Pollutants may be highly biodegradable and have only a locally adverse effect, whereas less or non-biodegradable pollutants may have longterm effects on both local and global marine environments. Pollutants can
be classified into several scientific categories: (1) hydrocarbons (basically
oil and gas); (2) hydrocarbon compounds utilized as organic contaminants, inhibitors, and poisons; (3) heavy metals; (4) radioactive wastes;

18. Id. at iv.
19. Id. at 1-8. Contra Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 869-79 n.1.
20. OCEAN DUMPING REPORT, supra note 11, at 3.
21. Ocean Dumping: Hearings on H.R. 6112, H.R. 6113, and H.R. 6324 Before the Subcomm. On Oceanographyand the Subcomm. On FisheriesAnd Wildlife Conservation And
The Environment of the House Comm. On Merchant Marine and Fisheries,97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 126 (1982) (statement of Brig. Gen. Forrest T. Gay III) [hereinafter cited as 1982
Ocean Dumping Hearings].
22. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 755.
23. COUNCIL ENVTL. QUALITY, ENvTL. QUALrry 1982 1, 46 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
CEQ 1982 REPORT].
24. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 755-56.
25. "Biomagnification refers to the increase in toxicant concentration which occurs in
successively higher trophic level organisms in an ecosystem." Dredge Spoil Disposal And
PCB Contamination:Hearings Before the House Comm. On Merchant Marine And Fisheries, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 512 (1980) (statement of Frank G. Wilkes) [hereinafter cited as
1980 Dredge Spoil Hearings].
26. Id.
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and (5) solid wastes (including particulate pollution). Of these, heavy
metals, poisons, and radioactive wastes are especially hazardous because
they tend to bioaccumulate" in marine organisms."
The adverse effects of these hazardous wastes are numerous. High
levels of pollutants which bioaccumulate have led to "bioconcentration"
that kills marine organisms or anything which feeds on them. This phenomenon has killed marine stocks and made surviving stocks inedible,
thus causing severe economic loss to the fishing industry. 9
More serious is the long-range impact of pollutants on the marine
environment. First, pollutants affect some species more than others. The
resulting diminution of species variety is known to upset the ecobalance.
Secondly, organic wastes, particularly sewage sludge, require oxygen for
decomposition. When organic wastes are dumped, they deplete the oxygen in adjacent waters to the extent that some organisms cannot survive.
The cycle is accelerated when deceased organisms decompose and further
deplete oxygen concentrations in that process. A vicious cycle of death,
decay and depletion ensues which threatens the hardiest marine organisms.3 0 The oxygen deficiency may continue for years-long after the
dumping has ceased.3"
Due to the volume and types of wastes dumped annually, particularly
toxic materials and radioactive wastes, the need to understand the impact
of these wastes and to expand international environmental cooperation
must receive priority."2
II.
A.

AN ANALYSIS OF OCEAN DUMPING

Delimitation of the Problem

There are three traditional problem areas involved in analyzing international ocean dumping and its ramifications. These problems, whether
dealt with either as international concerns or as national problems, are
eventually faced by the entire international community.3 " The first area
of concern deals with determining what constitutes pollution. The most
widely invoked definition of marine pollution is that agreed upon in 1970

27. "Bioaccumulation refers to those processes by means of which organisms take up
chemicals from the physico-chemical environment and incorporate them into some or all of
their tissues." 1982 Ocan Dumping Heariga ,,nr nntp. 21. .t 449 (submission of the

International Association of Ports and Harbors).
28. Waldichuk, supra note 2, at 280.
29. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 756.
30. See Comment, Ocean Dumping: Progress Toward A Rational Policy of Dredged
Waste Disposal, 12 ENvTL. L. 745, 751 nn.37-42 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Ocean Dumping
Progress].
31. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 757.
32. CEQ 1980 REPoRT, supra note 5, at 15.
33. As noted by Captain Cousteau, "[e]ach one of the cells of our bodies is a miniature

ocean. Poisoning the sea will inevitably poison us." 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings, supra
note 21, at 188 (statement of Jacques-Yves Cousteau).
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by the United Nations Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects
of Marine Pollution (GESAMP):
Introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy
into the marine environment (including estuaries) resulting in such
deleterious effects as harm to living resources, hazard to human
health, hindrance to marine activities including fishing, impairment of
quality for use of sea water, and reduction of amenities.'
The Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) 5 enumerates the preferred definition in article 1, paragraph 1(4), which incorporates the GESAMP wording.
(4) "pollution of the marine environment" means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to
result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and
marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities,
including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of
quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities; . .

.36

Similarly, in article 1, paragraph 1(5), the LOS Convention enumerates
the best definition for ocean dumping.
5. (a) "[D]umping" means:
(i) any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea;
(ii) any deliberate disposal of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other manmade structures at sea;
(b) "[D]umping" does not include:
(i) the disposal of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived
from the normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other
man-made structures at sea and their equipment, other than wastes or
other matter transported by or to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other
man-made structures at sea, operating for the purpose of disposal of
such matter or derived from the treatment of such wastes or other
matter on such vessels, aircraft, platforms or structures;
(ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal
thereof, provided37 that such placement is not contrary to the aims of
this Convention.

34. See Kutner, The Control and Prevention of TransnationalPollution: A Case for
World Habeas Ecologicus, 9 LAw. AM. 257, 260 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Kutner].
35. Done Dec. 10, 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as LOS Convention].
36. Id. art. 1, para. 1(4). This version of paragraph 4 is reprinted pursuant to the copy
of the LOS Convention in 21 I.L.M. 1261. The LOS Convention as reproduced by the U.S.
State Department has the words "(including estuaries)" in parentheses instead of being offset by commas.
37. LOS Convention, supra note 35, art. 1, para. 1(5). The margins in paragraph 5 differ between the version of the LOS Convention reproduced by the U.S. State Department
and the version reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261.
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Thus, the test of whether the disposal of unwanted materials constitutes
"ocean dumping" focuses on "intent" (i.e., deliberate disposal).
Any definition of ocean dumping necessarily involves many of the
problems inherent in defining "pollution." Five categories have been suggested for approaching definitional problems. Pollution can be viewed as:
a. any alteration of the existing environment,
b. the right of the territorial sovereign,
c. damage per se,
d. interference with other uses of the environment, and
38
e. any excess beyond the assimilation capacity of the environment.
The first two approaches define the boundaries or limits of pollution,
and therefore, they are not viewed as realistic alternatives. When referring to pollution as just "damage" per se, two factors must be determined. First, determinations must be made of which injured countries,
individuals, and properties may seek redress. The standards must be set
for those damages which are compensable. For example, the question
arises as to whether damages must be tangible injuries which can be recompensed monetarily or can intangible injuries also demand compensation? In addition, the level and magnitude of damages must also be delimited by reference to a high or low threshold.3 9 In other words, does
injury take place when a serious, proven action endangers the health or
property of another, or is it possible that the injury has occurred when
the action causes substantial inconvenience or discomfort? The major
fault with this definitional approach is that a high threshold approach is
generally adopted, ignoring gradual yet constant impairments.
Pollution as "interference" with other uses of the environment has an
anti-ecological basis, and it is the result of international agreements regulating busy waterways and ocean areas. "The environment is important
only to the degree that it is useful to man's immediate interests and environmental alteration is something to be halted only if the benefits of so
doing . ..outweigh the costs."4
Pollution as "exceeding the assimilative capacity of the environment"
is generally considered to be the best approach. Due to the growing realization of the frailty and interdependence of the components of the biosphere, it has been recognized that certain pollution, either in quantity or
kind, cannot hp decomDosed or rendered harmless by natural
processes-thus exceeding the ocean's assimilative capacity."1 Although
theoretically sound, this approach fails to resolve certain practical issues.
First, it is difficult to determine the assimilative limits of a given environ-

38. Springer, Towards a Meaningful Concept of Pollution in International Law, 26
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 531, 533 (1977).

39. Id. at 538.
40. Id. at 544.
41. Id. at 548.
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ment. It is equally difficult to ascertain when actual damage has been
done to the integrity of natural cycles. Second, there is a problem with
delimiting the point at which the quantity of the pollution exceeds the
"assimilative capacity" of the environment.42 Research has led the scientific community to conclude that marine systems can be safely used for
waste disposal if such disposal is carefully managed. 43 Furthermore, eliminating the oceans as an alternative disposal site would transfer all waste
management problems to land and air media." For wastes which are biodegradable and nonaccumulative in marine organisms, the ocean would
be a reasonable disposal site.4 5 Assimilative capacity models, which incorporate a number of factors considered by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in establishing and revising ocean dumping criteria, suffer
from numerous weaknesses."' One of the most important limitations is
the absence of empirical data which has impeded efforts to estimate the
47
endpoints of contaminants for particular ocean areas.
Previously undiscovered dangers of PCB's and DDT in dredge spoils
and sewage sludge, for example, highlight the lack of scientific evidence
with respect to ocean dumping. 4" Short-term environmental analysis has
further compounded the problem situation and led to dangerously flawed
decisions for waste disposal via ocean dumping. Due to the lack of knowledge regarding the ocean's assimilative capacity, the tendency has been to
proceed with rapacious ocean dumping.49
There are numerous international conventions which impact upon

42. For a brief discussion of materials which the ocean can safely assimilate, see Waste
Dumping: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation And
The Environment of the House Comm. On Merchant Marine and Fisheries,97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 83-85 (1981) (statement of Kenneth S. Kamlet) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Waste
Dumping Hearings].
43. Swanson & Devine, Ocean Dumping Policy, ENV'T, June 1982, at 14, 16 [hereinafter
cited as Swanson & Devine]. "[W]aste disposal policies are changing to allow the cautious
and studied use of the oceans as a waste disposal medium." 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings,
supra note 21, at 295 (statement of NACOA). Research results indicate that some wastes
can reasonably be dumped in the oceans, but research and monitoring measures must be
undertaken to protect the ocean. Id.
44. See Ocean Dumping Progress, supra note 30, at 748.
45. Id.
46. Note, Ocean Dumping of Sewage Sludge: The Tide Turns From Protection to
Management. 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 395, 429-30 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Dumping
Sludge].
47. Id. at 430.
48. "[T]he complex toxicological interactions of PCB's with other contaminants such as
petroleum hydrocarbons, pesticides, and heavy metals" are not fully understood. 1980
Dredge Spoil Hearings, supra note 25, at 142 (statement of Lynn A. Greenwalt).
It is known, however, that these materials do not act alone and that most, if
not all, test methods used do not adequately predict latent and chronic toxic
effects of individual contaminants, let alone the mixtures of materials that are
known to be present in some dredge materials.
Id.
49. 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings, supra note 21, at 189 (statement of Rep. Norman
E. D'Amours).
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the problems of ocean dumping, but these conventions should generally
be categorized as dealing with vessel-source pollution or land-based pollution. The most comprehensive international convention is the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter (Ocean Dumping Convention).5" Prior to this Convention, the United States enacted narrowly tailored legislation to control
specific pollutants or categories of pollutants that impacted upon ocean
dumping. Ocean dumping per se, however, was not regulated until the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA). 5'
Although the MPRSA was enacted on October 23, 1972,52 its primary
purpose was to implement the Ocean Dumping Convention, which entered into force for the United States on August 30, 1975. 53 In fact, the
MPRSA is frequently referred to as the "Ocean Dumping Act," 4 but
since it also encompasses important issues involving ocean research and
marine sanctuaries, "MPRSA" is probably a more appropriate short
form.
Both the Ocean Dumping Convention, and the MPRSA prohibit the
dumping of dangerous wastes and license the dumping of other wastes,5"
and both specify that some consideration must be given with regard to
the environmental effects of land disposal alternatives during the reviewing process for applications for ocean dumping permits." Each system
allowed an exception for trace amounts of contaminants from the prohibited lists. In dealing with the problem of how much is too much, the
Ocean Dumping Convention provided that parties shall prohibit dumping
of those wastes listed in Annex I (the "blacklist"). 57 Annex I listed organ-

50. Done Dec. 29, 1972, [19751 2 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165 (entered into force Aug.
30, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Ocean Dumping Convention]. While this Convention is com-

monly termed the "London Convention," the "London Dumping Convention," or the
"London Ocean Dumping Convention," it is less confusing to use the terminology "Ocean
Dumping Convention" because there have been and probably will be more "London Conventions" (particularly since IMCO is largely based in London). Accordingly, this Convention should be referred to as the "Ocean Dumping Convention."
51. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
52. See Letter from Secretary of State William P. Rogers to President Richard M.
Nixon (Feb. 13, 1973), reprinted in G.P.O., CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARINE
POLLUTION, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., v (Doc. No. 83-118).
53. Id. See also Amendments to the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act
nf 1972. in order to implement the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Pub. L. No. 93-254, 88 Stat. 50
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1401-1444 (1976)), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 611 (1974).

54. See, e.g., Kuersteiner & Herbach, In Pursuit of Clean Oceans- A Review Of The
Marine Protection,Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 157, 159 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Kuersteiner]; Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 879.
55. See Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 904.
56. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 424.
57. Ocean Dumping Convention, supra note 50, art. 4; Dumping Dilemma, supra note
10, at 896-97. The lists of substances contained in Annexes I and II are not exhaustive. Any
country is free to prohibit the dumping of wastes and other materials not mentioned in
either Annex. Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 897.
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ohalogens, mercury, cadmium, persistent materials (plastics), oil, highlevel radioactive wastes, and chemical and biological warfare (CBW)
materials, among other pollutants." Annex I, however, permitted disposal
of the proscribed materials which are:
"rapidly rendered harmless by physical, chemical or biological
processes in the sea provided they do not:
(i) make edible marine organisms unpalatable, or
(ii) endanger human health or that of domestic animals." 9
In addition, the incineration at sea of organohalogen compounds, crude
oil and petroleum products was exempted by amendment in October of
1978.60 The prohibitions of Annex I did not apply to wastes or other
containing the aforematerials (e.g., sewage sludges and dredged spoils)
'
mentioned pollutants as "trace contaminants."'
Marine scientists have generally agreed that a "trace" constitutes
concentrations which are commensurate with levels normally found in the
ocean (e.g., natural levels). However, the problem of definition has become complicated when directed toward certain organohalogens (such as
PCB's and DDT) which are man-made contaminants yet present in
Dumping Convendumped waste.6 2 Neither the MPRSA nor the Ocean
63
tion could define trace contaminants numerically.
Sewage sludge and dredged spoils, generally taken from commercial
harbors, contain concentrations of "blacklisted materials" which are far
in excess of those which naturally occur.6 4 In spite of this fact, ocean
dumping of hazardous sludge and spoils is allowed (in limited quantities)
due to the nature of these waters.6" This seems contrary to the spirit of
Annex I.
A related problem in this area deals with the economics of waste disposal and the degree to which alternative methods are available. Three

58. Ocean Dumping Convention, supra note 50, Annex. I.
59. Id.; see Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 896.
60. Ocean Dumping Convention, supra note 50, Annex I (10). Incineration of these
wastes requires a special permit prior to disposal.
61. Id. Annex I. "Such wastes shall be subject to the provisions of Annexes II and III as
appropriate." Id.
62. Rogers, Ocean Dumping, 7 ENvTL. L. 1, 13 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rogers].
63. Schenke, The Marine Protection,Research, and SanctuariesAct: The Conflict Between Marine Protection and Oil and Gas Development, 18 Hous. L. REv. 987, 1001 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Schenke].
64. Rogers, supra note 62, at 13; see 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings,supra note 21, at
173 (statement of EPA); see also 1980 Dredge Spoil Hearings,supra note 25, at 331 (statement of Kenneth S. Kamlet). "[Much of the spoil material dredged from the New York
Harbor area is severely contaminated with highly toxic, persistent, and often carcinogenic
chemicals, many of which are subject to biological uptake (from water and sediments) at
levels which may have serious implications for health and the environment." Id.
65. Schenke, supra note 63, at 999. Dredged spoils received special consideration under
Annex I. Hazardous toxic materials found in dredge waters were automatically defined as
"trace" contaminants. Id.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 13:2-3

major land-based alternatives to the ocean disposal of sludge, for example, have become commercially feasible: (1) landfilling, (2) landspreading,
and (3) incineration. 6 Although these three alternative methods have
been used safely and effectively, each poses potential risks to human
health and the environment.6 7 Landfilling and landspreading of sludge
containing high concentrations of heavy metals and soluble materials contaminate groundwater.6 Sludge spread on agricultural fields threatens
human food supplies when crops absorb certain toxic contaminants.6 9 Incineration of sewage sludge, considered the most effective mode of disposal, presents environmental problems created by gaseous and particulate
emissions.70 In addition, disposal of ash residue produced through incineration endangers the environment because high concentrations
of heavy
7
metals found in sludge become residues in the ash. '
Incineration of wastes at sea, in specially designed tankers, offers
perhaps the best means of disposing of certain ultra-hazardous chemical
wastes.7 2 However, the high-temperature, high-efficiency, combustion

66. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 411.
Landfilling involves placing the waste in landfills or impounding it in storage
lagoons or basins; it is the most common sludge disposal technique in the
United States, accounting for approximately forty-four percent of the sludge
generated. Landspreading involves using the waste as fertilizer or as soil conditioner and accounts for about twenty-four percent of the sludge. Approximately twenty-two percent of the sludge is incinerated.
Id. For a more detailed discussion of the various sludge management alternatives, see 1981
Waste Dumping Hearings, supra note 42, at 467-70 (statement of Christopher J. Capper).
67. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 411.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 411-12.
70. See id. at 412.
71. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 412.
72. Farrington, Capuzzo, Leschine, & Champ, Ocean Dumping, 25 OCEANuS 39, 45
(1982-83) [hereinafter cited as Farrington].
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has allowed several test burnings
of chlorinated organic chemical wastes at sea where the basic chemical nature
of seawater rapidly neutralizes the hydrochloric acid that is the main combustion product of concern. Burning such wastes on land requires difficult and
potentially expensive controls on the release of this acid to prevent adverse
effects on nearby structures, plants, animals, and people.
Id. Incineration of toxic wastes at sea has been used for more than a decade by European
counLries, w c are.......
,.".
+ - exp eriment than the U.S. in the utilization of
alternate disposal methods. EPA permission for the operation of the Vulcanus II, a commercial incineration vessel, has not come easily. In October of 1983, EPA tentatively approved a three-year permit for the Vulcanus II to burn hazardous wastes in U.S. waters.
Critics of the incineration process contended that the ship was not adequately tested. Lancaster, Waste Management Still Hits Snags In Bid To Operate Incinerator Ship, Wall St.
J., Nov. 17, 1983, Sec. 2, at 35, Cols. 4-6. In addition, land-based operators are required to
install costly pollution-cleansing scrubbers which are not mandated for sea operated incinerators. The installation of these devices on incinerator ships would reduce considerably the
ships' expected cost edge. See id. Failure to install such pollution-control equipment, however, may merely transform the ocean dumping pollution problem into a degradation of the
atmosphere.
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technology
including:

of

incineration

entails

several

adverse

characteristics

a. the difficulty of ensuring continued high efficiency of operations;
b. the risk of accidental spills of material during collection, storage,
loading, and transit at sea; and
c. the high cost of the
fuel necessary to achieve and maintain the re7
quired temperatures. 3
Pollution controls seldom reveal tangible benefits. The social utility
of a pollution-free environment is often quite difficult to ascertain. 74 Economic and political factors dominate the final decision on the methods
utilized to dispose of unwanted materials." Dumping pollutants into the
oceans is frequently the mode which is the most economically and politically expedient.70 Environmental regulations, increased energy costs, and
the dwindling availability of land have dramatically increased the cost
differential of non-ocean disposal methods. 77 The estimated costs of landbased alternatives may be 10 to 100 times greater than the costs of ocean
disposal.78 For example, composting sewage sludge generated by New
York City would entail a capital cost of $250 million and require an annual operating budget of $45 million. 79 In contrast, the total expense of
ocean disposal of the same sludge over the same period would cost approximately $3 million.80
Users of the ocean as a resource for waste disposal generate costs
external to themselves that are borne by others."1 These costs, called externalities or external diseconomics, are absorbed elsewhere by society.82
"[B]ecause ocean dumpers do not have to pay for ocean dumping and
disposal property, and because the ocean has no nearby constituency,
ocean dumping is economically and politically expedient." 3 If policymakers consider the full costs of ocean dumping and the impact of marine
pollution on the quality of human life, the cost differential of alternative
disposal media may prove less troublesome and ocean disposal less attractive. "[T]hose who would use the ocean to subsidize their enterprises

73. Farrington, supra note 72, at 45.
74. Waldichuk, supra note 2, at 283.
75. Id. at 277.
76. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 415.
77. Id. "As sites for landfilling or landspreading become less available, the costs of
transporting the sewage sludge become significant." Id. at 415-16. "Large energy requirements have always made incineration a relatively expensive disposal technique, but the energy demands of air pollution control technology have recently increased these expenses."
Id. at 416.
78. Bleicher, The Battle Over Ocean Dumping, 12 ENvTL. L. R". 15,032, 15,033 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Dumping Battle].
79.Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 416.
80. Id.
81. Waldichuk, supra note 2, at 276.
82. Id.
83. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 425.
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ought to bear the burden of proof that no irreversible damage will result
now, or in the future."" ' '
Thus, the problem is that "[olften, the economics of a particular disposal operation, rather than its ecological impact, will determine the final
disposal practice." 85 This situation is illustrated by the former practice in
the United States of disposing of low-level radioactive wastes by dumping
them into the coastal waters of California. From 1946 to 1970, these
wastes were dumped by the United States under regulations established
by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which were set prior to the
international controls on low-level waste disposal.86 Due to stricter dumping policies adopted by the AEC and due to the attractiveness of shallow
burial of wastes on land, U.S. ocean disposal of low-level radioactive
wastes declined in importance and was eventually terminated in 1970.8,
Thereafter, as a result of the high cost of sea disposal, these wastes were
buried inland at a lower cost. Although the termination of this ocean
dumping was a long-term benefit to life in coastal U.S. waters, the fact
remains that economics, rather than ecological impact, was the determining factor."
Due to a shortage of inexpensive land disposal sites, the pendulum
may swing toward greater use of ocean dumping for radioactive wastes.
Despite the dumping moratorium adopted by Congress, effective through
January 6, 1985,11 the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has conducted
feasibility research on using the seabed for disposal of high-level radioactive wastes."' In addition, the DOE has advanced a proposal to dump

84. 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings, supra note 21, at 188 (statement of Jacques-Yves

Cousteau).
85. Waldichuk, supra note 2, at 277.
86. Finn, Ocean Disposal of Radioactive Wastes: The Obligation of International Cooperation to Protect the Marine Environment, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 621, 632 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Finn]. Following passage of the MPRSA, jurisdiction over radioactive waste

disposal by the United States shifted to the EPA. Id. at 633. Internationally, the Ocean
Dumping Convention vested regulatory authority over "rad-waste" dumping with IMCO
and technical oversight with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). See id. A
thorough analysis of radioactive waste dumping is beyond the scope of this article. For a
comprehensive examination of radioactive waste disposal issues, see id. at 621-90; 1981
Waste Dumping Hearings, supra note 42, at 381-464.
87. Finn, supra note 86, at 632-33.
00
IdT..1
,I
supra nte 9., at 277.

89. Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 424(a), 96
Stat. 2165 (1983) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1414).
90. CEQ 1982 REPORT, supra note 23, at 97. The ocean disposal option is favored for
several reasons: (1) "developing marine technology may provide the means to design, imple-

ment, and monitor a disposal system": (2) deep-seabed sediments, "which would tend to
trap released radionuclides from high level waste, constitute one of the most geologically
stable environments in the world"; (3) the ocean provides "a medium of dilution for any
wastes released from a repository"; (4) ocean sites would provide "resistance to future
human intrusion"; and (5) ocean repositories would reduce domestic political pressures associated with selecting land-based sites. Finn, supra note 86, at 640-41. On the other hand,
ocean disposal of radiological wastes involves several troubling risks:
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thousands of cubic yards of radioactive soil generated by the 1950's Manhattan Project and other contaminated materials created in similar energy programs."' Similarly, the U.S. Navy has explored the possibility of
dumping irradiated decommissioned nuclear submarines at sea after
defueling their reactors. 92 These evolving U.S. interests in ocean dumping
indicate that the trend in balancing economic costs and ecological effect
will extend the pollution hazards of radiological wastes to the marine
environment.9 3
Other industrialized countries have also dumped low-level radioactive wastes into the ocean. 94 Pursuant to the Ocean Dumping Convention,
Western European disposal operations have dumped much larger
amounts of these wastes than the previous amounts dumped by the
United States. 95 During the period between 1967 and 1979, dumping by
European countries exceeded one-half million curies of radioactive waste,
whereas total U.S. dumping between 1946 and 1970 approximated 94,630

(1) Wastes are irretrievable once they have been placed in the ocean. What
may appear to be acceptable today may prove unacceptable tomorrow. It is
necessary to maintain the option of future remedial action because we do not
have a full understanding of the ecological consequences of ocean disposal of
radioactive materials.
(2) The bioaccumulation of radionuclides is poorly understood. Radioactive
materials may pose serious health threats to future generations.
(3) There has been no clear demonstration of the need or advantages of ocean
dumping of radioactive materials other than political or financial
considerations.
(4) Opening the ocean as a dumping ground for radioactive wastes encourages
the proliferation of such wastes, and discourages the minimization of waste
generation ...
1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings,supra note 21, at 551-52 (statement of Edmund G. Brown,

Jr.).
91. Disposal of Decommissioned Nuclear Submarines: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1982) (statement of
Clifton E. Curtis) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Submarine Hearing].
92. Id. at 2. The United States Navy has not identified a preferred alternative, and no
immediate plans have been made to dispose of nuclear powered vessels. No deep-ocean sites
have been selected. However, deep ocean disposal is being examined because it might produce negligible environmental harms at lower costs than land burial alternatives. Id. at 4
(testimony of Carl H. Schmitt).
93. Cf. U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS JAN.-DEc. 1980, 18
(1981) [hereinafter cited as EPA 1980 REPORT] (based on environmental impact survey results, the EPA has concluded that past ocean dumping of radioactive wastes by the United
States has not caused harm to either man or the marine ecosystem).
94. Finn, supra note 86, at 633. However, these activities may be reversed following
passage of a Spanish resolution calling for the suspension of sea dumping of radioactive
waste. The resolution, enacted at a 1983 meeting of the parties to the Ocean Dumping Convention in London, would suspend dumping until 1985, while the IAEA assessed the environmental safety of ocean disposal. The resolution, as such, is non-binding but serves as
moral persuasion against ocean dumping. See Cruickshank, Disposing of intermediate and

low level waste in Britain, NUCLEAR
95. Finn, supra note 86, at 635.

ENGINEERING INT'L,

Aug. 1983, at 33, 35.
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curies.9 6 The vast magnitude of the European operations, when coupled
with the possibility of future dumping by the United States, highlights
the need for transnational cooperation.17 Without an internationally enforceable policy on radioactive waste dumping, "a mad dash toward using
the oceans as a less expensive, quick fix for waste disposal will occur without due consideration of the relative risks and benefits of all options for
waste management. "s
The MPRSA authorized the EPA to deny ocean disposal of wastes
containing any of several types of "prohibited materials" (organohalogens, mercury, cadmium, oil, and others) unless present only as trace
contaminants, in which case an application must be made for a special or
interim permit. The definitional problem with trace contaminants has
been previously discussed. 9
Interim permits require their holders to take effective action to develop alternatives to ocean dumping. However, sewage sludge, the waste
substance most often dumped under interim permits, was not originally
subject to this type of implementation plan."'0 Certain sludge wastes cannot be sufficiently modified to eliminate the accumulation of all hazardous substances.0 1 Even so, it has been proven that there are economically
feasible recycling alternatives for sewage sludge, particularly when external costs are considered. 0 2 Inclusion of sewage sludge in the implementation plan requirement has pressured municipalities to find recycling alternatives. 10 3 In addition, holders of "special permits," who were not
required to formulate implementation plans, were encouraged to search
for alternatives.
Another problem area deals with international uniformity and the
method of regulation. Under one international legal interpretation, the
ocean is res communes, i.e., the common possession of mankind.'0 4 According to the concept known as the "tragedy of the commons," property
which is the common heritage of humanity belongs to no one in particular
and therefore, gets no special attention for preservation. 0 5 Accordingly,
each country is motivated to maximize its short-term benefits in using
common property resources-in this instance, the utilization of the

96. Id. at 632-33.
97. Id. at 633.
98. Farrington, supra note 72, at 50.
99. See footnotes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
100. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 775-76.
101. See 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings,supra note 21, at 297 (statement of Dr. John
A. Knauss).
102. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 776.
103. Id.
104. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 424-25. The other international legal interpretation is that the ocean is res nullius; i.e., the property of no one. It should be noted that res
communes is frequently misspelled res communis.
105. Ocean Dumping Progress, supra note 30, at 748; see Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK (G. DeBell ed. 1970).
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oceans for dumping.' Since each country is a sovereign, each can theoretically despoil the environment in any manner it desires.'0 7 The dumping of materials in deeper ocean waters, legally accessible to any country,
may be especially damaging because the site chosen may fall below the
"thermocline," where conditions on the ocean floor are generally unvarying and marine organisms are highly sensitive to change. '
Most ocean disposal takes place within the territorial waters or contiguous zone of a country due to considerations of convenience and due to
high transportation costs. It has been suggested that "90 percent or more
of the particles originating in rivers or discharged to the oceans settle out
at the discharge site or never leave the coastal zone."' 0 9 However, if the
settling rate is slow, a pollutant may be carried by currents from the coast
of one country to another. In either case, fish feeding in coastal zones can
be caught in international zones-possibly transferring one country's pollutants to the people of another. Waters washing ashore on the Antarctic
continent have already showed signs of pollution originating from other
parts of the world." This problem illustrates the internationality and
commonality of the marine pollution dilemma. Wastes discharged into
the oceans do not respect political boundaries."' Therefore, a need exists
for uniformity of standards for effluent discharges and water quality from
one country to another. "Both use and abuse of the seas are of consequence to all peoples; a GLOBAL OCEAN POLICY thus must be established to define a common set of principles and rules for activities of indi' 2
vidual nations and 'a fortiori' for states and cities."

106. See Waldichuk, supra note 2, at 276.
107. Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 870 n.4. As noted by one commentator:
Developing nations are unimpressed by the dilatory environmental chivalry of
developed nations which while themselves industrializing polluted with impunity. These nations are not easily swayed by arguments favoring strong environmental protection measures, believing that if such stringent standards are
applied to them their development will be considerably more difficult, expensive, and inconvenient. England only recently began ocean dumping its sewage
sludge and is disturbed by the U.S. example of strictly controlling such
dumping.
Id.
108. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 755 n.13.
109. Rogers, supra note 62, at 21 n.86.
110. 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings, supra note 21, at 188 (statement of Jacques-Yves
Cousteau).
111. Farrington, supra note 72, at 49.
112. 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings, supra note 21, at 188 (statement of Jacques-Yves
Cousteau) (emphasis original).
The Pilatus syndrome-that is, dump it and wash your hands-is no longer an
expediency. It has now developed into an entirely new, fundamental moral issue. What we dump "out of sight" in the sea will not remain for long "out of
mind." The anonymous crime of conventional poison dumping is aimed at no
one in particular, but it may bring about agonies around the world. The ultimate conceivable escalation consists in threatening not just other nations who
are endangered by our recklessness, but whole generations to come.
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Goals

Both the Ocean Dumping Convention and the MPRSA clearly delineate which pollutants are prohibited from being dumped into the oceans.
However, if these contaminants are present as traces in dredged spoils or
sewage sludge, they may be readily dumped-often in very high concentrations. This dumping violates the spirit of both the Ocean Dumping
Convention and the MPRSA. In pure form, these contaminants are prohibited because they are dangerous, regardless of the particular type of
waste in which they are found.
An international organization, such as the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)," 3 should establish standards
which resolve certain questions. For example, this international body
should resolve: (1) whether "trace" really means concentrations normally
found in the ocean (i.e., natural levels), (2) whether the phrase means
only that each nation should dump as little of the blacklisted substances
as possible, or (3) whether whole categories of common wastes such as
dredge spoil and sewage sludge are to be exempt from Annex ."4
The permissible concentrations of toxic materials in ocean dumped
wastes has received a good deal of discussion, but little attention has been
given to "the more difficult environmental and legal question of how
much total waste should be allowed to be dumped."'1' IMCO should determine the overall levels of waste mentioned herein and investigate their
potential ramifications. This gap in ecological understanding highlights
the vast need for further marine scientific investigation, and therefore, a
maximum amount of freedom of research should be encouraged"" to protect the "common heritage of mankind." The sine qua non7 of protecting
the marine environment is freedom of scientific research."1
Another major goal should be to encourage harmony between international and national laws. In the United States, "[tihe EPA ocean
dumping program [as defined by the MPRSA] is one of the few national
environmental regulatory programs significantly affected by international
law." 118 The Ocean Dumping Convention establishes international rules

113. In 1982, IMCO changed its official name to the International Maritime Organization, but it is still commonly referred to as IMCO. For a brief discussion on the formation of
IMCO, see Kindt, Special Claims Impacting Upon Marine Pollution issues At "The Third
U.N. Conference On The Law Of The Sea, 10 CAL. W. INr'L L.J. 397, 432 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Special Claims].
114. Rogers, supra note 62, at 20-21.
115. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
116. See e.g., 1982 Submarine Hearing,supra note 91, at 123 (statement of Clifton E.
Curtis).
117. Kindt, The Effects of Claims by Developing Countries on LOS International
Marine Pollution Negotiations, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 313, 339 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Effects of Claims].
118. Rogers, supra note 62, at 6.
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of conduct. 1 9 However, incorporating the Convention into U.S. environmental law and regulatory policy created two problems. First, there was
confusion due to contradictions between the MPRSA and the Ocean
Dumping Convention. 20 Secondly, national laws of the participating
countries were not uniform, so that actions taken in one country would
often undermine the efforts of another country. An example of this international vis-a-vis national disharmony was the unilateral decision by
Canada in 1970 to exercise jurisdictional control over a 100-mile "pollution zone." At the time, creation of such a zone was criticized as a flagrant
violation of international law.' 2 ' Canada responded by asserting that the
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act' 22 was enacted to remedy international legal weaknesses that failed to protect Canadian shores from pollution. 22 Such unilateral extensions of jurisdiction, for whatever reason,
need to be discouraged since the LOS Convention addresses this type of
24
problem.'
The final and perhaps most challenging goal pertains to the implementation of an international regulatory scheme. Defining what the law
should be has been less difficult than agreeing on how to enforce the law
and deciding who should carry out the enforcement. Regional arrangements appear to be the best means of approaching this particular
problem 2 "
C.

Historical Background
1.

U.S. Legislation
a.

General U.S. Legislation

Substantial international regulation of ocean dumping has taken
place only since the 1950's. For this reason, U.S. legislation and regulation policy as well as international regulations need to be reevaluated.
There are similarities between U.S. and international law, and these similarities will be analyzed after an examination of pertinent U.S. legislation.

119. See Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 885-86; Dumping Sludge, supra note 46,

at 403. The MPRSA was amended in 1974 providing that "[t]o the extent that he may do so
without relaxing the requirements of this subchapter, the Administrator, in establishing or
revising such criteria, shall apply the standards and criteria binding upon the United States
under the Convention, including its Annexes." 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1976).
120. See Kuersteiner, supra note 54, at 162-63.
121. Okidi, Toward Regional Arrangements for Regulation of Marine Pollution: An
Appraisal of Options, 40CEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1, 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Okidi];
Special Claims, supra, note 113, at 438 & n.282.
122. CAN. REV. STAT. c.2 (1st Supp. 1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 543 (1970).

123. Okidi, supra note 121, at 2. Canadian authorities argued that Canada had a sovereign right and duty to enact and enforce protective measures because of the "uniqueness
and fragility of the Arctic ecology." Id.
124. See LOS Convention, supra note 35, art. 194; cf. id. art. 234. Canadian claims for
protecting the Arctic are now specifically covered in the LOS Convention. Id. art. 234.
125. Effects of Claims, supra note 117, at 332.
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Prior to the 1970's, statutory and regulatory control exercised over
ocean dumping by the U.S. government was minimal.12 Although several
federal agencies possessed authority over limited facets of dumping activities, no single agency was empowered to regulate ocean waste disposal on
a comprehensive scale.12 Under the Supervisory Harbors Act of 1888,1"'
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) was delegated jurisdiction over
the removal of materials from various ports. For activities transpiring
within the territorial sea, the River and Harbors Appropriations Act of
1899129 (Refuse Act) and the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1905130 provided
13 1
legal support for the exercise of regulatory control by the Corps.
Historically, the Corps failed to utilize these acts to impose stringent
pollution control regulations. The only major action taken by the Corps
was to designate sites for ocean dumping. The limited use of its regulatory power was explained by the Corps' interpretation of its responsibilities as being directed toward problems concerning navigation, not pollution.' 2 In addition, during the early twentieth century the assimilative
capacity of the oceans was widely believed to be limitless. Public opinion
and legislation were generally insensitive to ocean dumping pollution
problems. Even during the growth of environmental awareness and activism in the 1950s and 1960s, the oceans were relatively ignored.' 33 It was
not until 1966 that Congress first ordered a comprehensive investigation
of marine issues. 4
Public concern in the United States was eventually aroused by the
dumping of sewage sludge and dredge spoils in the New York Bight.'" In
response to public concern, the Governor of New Jersey recommended
that: (1) sewage sludge dumping be phased out; (2) present dumpsites be
immediately moved 100 miles out to sea; (3) future Corps' permits be
conditioned upon a pledge for the termination of dumping; and (4) con
currence with New York State be sought through agreement or congressional enactment. 3 6 Alarmed by the technological gap between increased
wastes and ecologically safe ocean disposal methods, President Nixon directed the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to work with other

Ocean Dumping Progress, supra note 30, at 753-54.
Id. at 754.
33 U.S.C. §§ 441-454 (1976).
33 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
33 U.S.C. § 417 (1976).
Rogers, supra note 62, at 3.
Spirer, The Ocean Dumping Deadline: Easing the Mandate Millstone, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Spirer]. The enabling legislation was addressed to the navigational, as distinguished from the environmental, risks posed by ocean
dumping. Since the Congress was concerned that disposal of wastes at harbor entrances
would frustrate dredging operations, the Corps was vested with regulatory control over
dumping activities. Id.
133. Id. at 12.
134. Id.; see id. at 12 n.67.
135. See Spirer, supra note 132, at 13.
136. Id.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
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agencies and to recommend necessary research legislation and administrative actions.""7 In 1970, the report of the CEQ was transmitted to Congress along with President Nixon's endorsement of the conclusions and
legislative recommendations made by the CEQ.'38
b.

The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972

Prompted by the CEQ report, in 1972 the Congress passed the
MPRSA, 13 effective April 23, 1973. " 0 With enactment of Title I of the
MPRSA, Congress pursued two explicit objectives: (1) to regulate, as
much as possible, all disposal of wastes in ocean waters, and (2) to limit
strictly or prevent any such dumping that "would adversely affect human
health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological sys1 ' 41
tems, or economic potentialities.
The MPRSA attacks the problem of ocean dumping in two ways.
First, the MPRSA bans all dumping of materials (without a permit)
within the territorial sea (which can be 12 nautical miles) and the contiguous zone of the United States. Secondly, it prohibits all transportation
of materials from the United States for the purpose of ocean dumping,
unless authorized by a permit.1 42 The MPRSA provides control over both
the content and manner of dumping, without duplicating other environmental statutes, and it divides the power to issue permits between the
EPA and the Corps. Under the MPRSA, the EPA sets criteria for evaluation of all permit applications and issues permits for the dumping of all
materials except dredged spoils. The Corps issues permits for the dumping of dredged spoils using EPA's criteria. 43
In directing the EPA to establish criteria for the review of permit
applications, the MPRSA specified nine factors for EPA consideration. 4 4

137. Id. at 15.
138. See OCEAN DUMPING REPORT, supra note 11, at 1-11.
139. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
140. Rogers, supra note 62, at 4.
141. 33 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1976).
142. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 760.
143. Id at 763.
144. 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1976). The nine factors, which are not exclusive, include the
following:
(A) The need for the proposed dumping.
(B) The effect of such dumping on human health and welfare, including
economic, esthetic, and recreational values.
(C) The effect of such dumping on fisheries resources, plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, shore lines, and beaches.
(D) The effect of such dumping on marine ecosystems, particularly with
respect to(i) the transfer, concentration, and dispersion of such material and
its byproducts through biological, physical, and chemical processes, (ii)
potential changes in marine ecosystem diversity, productivity, and stability, and (iii) species and community population dynamics.
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For substances which are not prohibitied under Title I,"' the EPA's implementing guidelines 4" enumerated several categories of ocean dumping
permits.'
a. General permits may be issued for the dumping of small
amounts of those materials which cause minimal adverse environmental impacts (e.g., burial at sea involving human remains or ashes,
transport and sinking of vessels by the U.S. Navy during ordnance
testing, the sinking
of derelict vessels posing a threat to navigational
48
operations);
b. Special permits may be issued to dump materials which satisfy
the criteria"19 for reviewing and evaluating such applications, but they
may only be issued for a maximum of 3 years per permit; 50
c. Emergency permits may be issued to dump materials which
pose a danger to human health and which admit to no other feasible
solution;' 5'
d. Interim permits may be issued, not exceeding 1 year, for those
materials that do not comply with dumping criteria and for which no
feasible land-based alternatives exist. 5 This permit was scheduled
for phaseout on December 31, 1981;
e. Research permits may be issued to dump any materials into
the ocean when the scientific advantages outweigh the potential environmental damage. 15
f. Permits for incineration at sea are issued as research or in-

terim permits except where evaluations of the waste materials, incineration method, disposal location, and vessel have been conducted

(E) The persistence and permanence of the effects of the dumping.
(F) The effect of dumping particular volumes and concentrations of
such materials.
(G) Appropriate locations and methods of disposal or recycling, including land-based alternatives and the probable impact of requiring
use of such alternative locations or methods upon considerations affecting the public interest.
(H) The effect on alternate uses of oceans, such as scientific study,
fishing, and other living resource exploitation, and non-living resource
exploitation.
(I) In designating recommended sites, the Administrator shall utilize wherever feasible locations beyond the edge of the Continental Shelf.
Id.
145. See id. Radiological, chemical and biological warfare agents and high-level radioactive wastes are prohibited by the MPRSA from being dumped, and dredged material is
handled separately in section 1413.
146. 40 C.F.R. §§ 220-228 (1982).
147. Id. at § 220.3.
148. EPA 1980 REPORT, supra note 93, at 3.
149. 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1976).
150. 40 C.F.R. § 220.3(b) (1982).
151. Id. at § 220.3(c).
152. EPA 1980 REPORT, supra note 93, at 3; see 40 C.F.R. § 220.3(d) (1982).
153. EPA 1980 REPORT, supra note 93, at 3; 40 C.F.R. §220.3(e) (1982).
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previously, and warrant a special permit."'
However, before permits are issued, the EPA must give notice and an
opportunity for public hearings. 55
Title I of the MPRSA empowers the Administrator of the EPA to
designate areas where ocean dumping will be permitted or prohibited. 5 6
For violations of permit conditions, the EPA has the authority to revoke
or suspend the permit 57 and to assess civil penalties. 5 In addition, criminal proceedings may be initiated by the U.S. Attorney General against
persons who knowingly violate the MPRSA. 5 9 Under Title I, the U.S.
Coast Guard is empowered to utilize surveillance and other appropriate
enforcement measures to prevent unlawful transportation of dumping
materials or unlawful dumping. 60
Title II of the MPRSA requires the Secretary of Commerce to initiate a comprehensive and continuing program to monitor and research the
impact of ocean dumping. 6 ' The research program is conducted under
the auspices of the Department of Commerce-the lead agency being the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The research is directed at: (1) the consequences of overfishing, (2) the longrange effects of pollution, and (3) the man-induced changes in ocean ecosystems. 6 2 Title III authorizes NOAA to establish marine sanctuaries. 6 3
Although the MPRSA originally set no deadline for the termination
of ocean dumping, Congress expected such activity to be reduced or eliminated expeditiously. 4 To this end, the final regulations and criteria
adopted by the EPA in 1973 to evaluate dumping applications virtually
ignored the mitigating factors enumerated under the MPRSA.' 5 The
EPA relied almost completely upon considerations involving the type of
material dumped; hence, a restrictive approach was taken towards applying the criteria embodied in the MPRSA.6 6 With little scientific understanding regarding the impact of particular dumping practices, the EPA
cautiously elected to ban virtually all ocean disposal which could conceiv-

154. 40 C.F.R. § 220.3(0 (1982).
155. 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1976); see 40 C.F.R. § 222.3-222.4 (1982).
156. 33 U.S.C. § 1412(c) (1976).
157. Id. at § 1415(0.
158. Id. at § 1415(a).
159. Id. at § 1415(b). Criminal sanctions may also be assessed against a "person who
knowingly violates this subchapter, regulations promulgated under this subchapter, or a permit issued under this subchapter shall be fined not more than $50,000, or imprisoned for not
more than one year, or both." Id.
160. Id. at § 1417(c).
161. Id. at § 1441.
162. Id. at § 1442(a) (Supp. V 1981).
163. EPA 1980 REPORT, supra note 93, at 2.
164. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 402.
165. Spirer, supra note 132, at 20.
166. Id. at 20-21.
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ably be harmful to the environment. 67
The EPA's regulatory program for sewage sludge, implemented pursuant to the MPRSA, was increasingly criticized as being overly protective of the ocean, especially when limited availability of alternate disposal
options was considered. 6 8 In 1976, revised regulations and criteria were
issued by the EPA.' 9 While reiterating the EPA's opposition to ocean
dumping, these measures followed a more pragmatic scheme for evaluating the environmental acceptability of dumping sludge.' 70 This scheme
did not rely on the simple presence of certain specific toxic materials;
instead, it relied on the impact of the material upon marine ecosystems as
measured by bioassay and bioaccumulation tests. The EPA would permit
municipal sludge producers to continue dumping under interim permits
even if their waste failed to meet the new criteria, as long as the municipality exercised its best efforts to meet the standards.'"' Even so, these
regulations provided that interim permits would not be extended past
December 31, 1981.171
In 1977, Congress amended the MPRSA to prohibit dumping of all
sludge after 1981 which would "unreasonably degrade or endanger human
health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological systems, and economic potentialities."' 73 The congressional validation of the
interim permit system and the congressional agreement with the EPA's
December 31, 1981 deadline acted as motivating forces for the legislation.' 7 4 Approximately 3 years later, in 1980, Congress again revised the
MPRSA to restrict industrial waste disposal in a manner similar to that
imposed on sewage sludge. 17 5 However, the amendment allowed narrow
76
exceptions for research purposes and emergency situations.'
As 1981 began, circumstances encouraged alteration of the sludge
dumping moratorium of December 31st.17 7 Continued inflation, increased
consumption of energy, and politicized public discontent with government spending and regulation tempered the movement to clean-up the
environment.' 78 Increased expenses of the ocean dumping regulatory sys-

167. Id. at 21.
168. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 395.
169. Spirer, supra note 132, at 25.
170. See Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 407.
171. Spirer, supra note 132, at 25-26. The new criteria are set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 227.4
(1982).
172. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 408.
173. 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(d) (1982). The term "sewage sludge" is defined to mean "any
solid, semisolid, or liquid waste generated by a municipal wastewater treatment plant the
ocean dumping of which may unreasonably degrade or endanger human health, welfare, or
amenities, or the maritime environment, ecological systems, and economic potentialities."

Id.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See Dumping Battle, supra note 78, at 15,034.
Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1412a(a) (Supp. V 1981).
33 U.S.C. § 1412a(b)-(c) (Supp. V 1981).
Spirer, supra note 132, at 38.
Id. at 36.
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tern generated considerable political debate.' 79 A report by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) recommended that the EPA consider the environmental effects of land-based alternatives to ocean dumping before
banning ocean disposal.180 This recommendation was followed by a report
from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), advocating a "multimedium view" for sewage sludge disposal. 8 1 The National Advisory
Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere (NACOA) also endorsed the multimedia management of waste disposal.' 2 Finally, President Reagan initiated a policy for obviating environmental regulations and other federal
regulations in favor of greater state and local autonomy.' 83
In 1981, the City of New York successfully challenged the EPA's permit criteria in City of New York v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency.8 4 The Federal Court for the Southern District of New York
85
granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of New York City.1
Following this decision, the EPA could only enforce the 1981 dumping
moratorium with regard to materials which unreasonably degraded the
environment, and the EPA was ordered to revise its criteria to assess the
unreasonable degradative environmental impact of each application according to the statutory factors. 86 In addition, the Court prohibited any
action by the EPA which would force New York City to implement landbased alternatives "without evaluating and finding acceptable the actual
and potential environmental effects of land disposal.' 87 Accordingly, the

179. Id. at 37.
180. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 418.

181. Id.
The NAS called for a comparison of the suitability for waste disposal of each
environmental medium: ocean, land, and air. Sewage sludge, the NAS argued,
should be disposed of in the medium in which it would pose the least serious
environmental and public health risks. The report recommended that EPA not
carry out its plan to end all ocean dumping of sewage sludge because this
would exclude wastes from one environmental medium at the expense of the
remaining media.
Id. at 418-19.
182. Id. at 419. "NACOA is convinced that part of the present problem is the mediumby-medium approach that follows from the statutory regimes enacted by Congress (Clean
Air Act, the Ocean Dumping Act, the Clean Water Act, etc.) and the conflicting goals of
many of the existing laws." 1981 Waste Dumping Hearings,supra note 42, at 78-79 (statement of Dr. John A. Knauss). NACOA's 1981 recommendations included: (1) "[i]ncreased
incentives for reuse, recycling, and reduction of waste products;" (2) "[a]n integrated approach to weighing different waste disposal options;" (3) "[m]ore consistent environmental
criteria for disposal in different media;" (4) "[clontinuation of ocean disposal 'under appropriate management conditions and with adequate monitoring safeguards';" and (5)
"[i]ncreased emphasis on ocean disposal research and monitoring." 1982 Ocean Dumping
Hearings, supra note 21, at 290 (statement of Dr. John A. Knauss).
183. Spirer, supra note 132, at 38.
184. 543 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Citations are to the revised opinion issued on
Aug. 26, 1981.
185. 543 F. Supp. at 1115.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1099.
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"EPA could not lawfully adopt a policy of denying all permits without
examining and weighing an applicant's evidence that ocean dumping...
[was] the most reasonable alternative."' 88
In reaching its holding, the Court emphasized the "legislative history
of the MPRSA and the unreasonableness of the EPA's regulations as applied to New York City."18 9 The arbitrary manner in which the EPA ordered cessation of sludge dumping concerned the Court. 90 The Court also
rejected the EPA's argument that the 1977 amendment precluded the
agency from relaxing its criteria.'9 ' According to the Court, Congress
sought only to halt the EPA's prior practice which granted interim permits on the basis of good faith efforts by municipalities to comply."9 '
While the propriety of the Court's interpretation of the 1977 amendment
was debatable, 98 the Court made it clear that economic costs as well as
94
relative environmental impacts must be considered.
Under the Reagan Administration, the EPA modified its approach
toward the regulation of ocean dumping. 9 5 A more flexible policy toward
ocean disposal, coupled with the EPA's change of attitude (which was
modified to view the ocean as a valid dumping option), weighed heavily in
the EPA's decision not to appeal the City of New York holding.' 96 Although the EPA's move generated controversy,1 9 7 congressional attitudes
toward ocean dumping were mixed. 98 Through 1982 the legislative response to the EPA's decision not to appeal the City of New York decision
remained unsettled.' 9 ' While some members of Congress questioned the
need to ban ocean disposal of sewage sludge, other members still strongly
opposed this dumping. Several unsuccessful attempts to change the ocean
dumping provisions of the MPRSA were made by both sides to the

188. Id. at 1086.
189. Spirer, supra note 132, at 41.
190. Id. The Court concluded that:
(1) such cessation 'would result in no discernible improvement in the area of
the ocean around the dumpsite,' (2) no 'workable plan' for a long-term alternative had been found, (3) the cost of the city's proposed interim solution would
far exceed the cost of ocean dumping, and (4) implementation of the city's
land-based interim solution could pose serious environmental dangers which
the EPA had taken only a 'casual approach in evaluating.'
Id. at 41-42.
191. Dumping Sludge. supra note 46. at 421.
192. Id.
193. See Spirer, supra note 132, at 42-44.
194. Dumping Battle, supra note 78, at 15,035.
195. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 422.
196. Id.
197. Id. Representative Norman D'Amours (D-N.H.) has called the EPA's "decision 'a
betrayal of congressional trust' and a 'devastating blow' to efforts to end harmful dumping
practices." Id.
198. Id.
199. Spirer, supra note 132, at 47.
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Even so, Congress did amend the MPRSA relating to the ocean disposal of low-level radioactive waste by attaching a rider to the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982.201 Under the amendment, a moratorium on the issuance of permits for low-level radioactive waste dumping, except for research purposes, was to be enforced until January 6,
1985.202 After expiration of this partial moratorium, an applicant would
be required to prepare a site-specific disposal impact assessment. 03 Prior

200. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 422-23; see, e.g., Spirer, supra note 132, at 4748.
201. Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 424(a), 96 Stat. 2165-67 (1983) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. §§
1401, 1414).
202. Section 424(a)(h) of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 provides
that:
Notwithstanding any provision of this subchapter to the contrary, during
the two-year period beginning on January 6, 1983, no permit may be issued
under this subchapter that authorizes the dumping of any low-level radioactive
waste unless the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
determines(1) that the proposed dumping is necessary to conduct research(A) on new technology related to ocean dumping, or
(B) to determine the degree to which the dumping of such substances will degrade the marine environment;
(2) that the scale of the proposed dumping is limited to the smallest
amount of such material and the shortest duration of time that is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the research, such that the dumping will
have minimal adverse impact upon human health, welfare, and amenities, and the marine environment, ecological systems, economic potentialities, and other legitimate uses;
(3) after consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, that the potential benefits of such research will outweigh any such adverse impact; and
(4) that the proposed dumping will be preceded by appropriate baseline
monitoring studies of the proposed dump site and its surrounding
environment.
Each permit issued pursuant to this subsection shall be subject to
such conditions and restrictions as the Administrator determines to be
necessary to minimize possible adverse impacts of such dumping.
Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 424(a)(h), 96 Stat. 2165 (1983) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1414).
203. Section 424(a)(i) of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 provides
that:
(1) Two years after January 6, 1983, the Administrator may not issue a
permit under this chapter for the disposal of radioactive waste material until
the applicant, in addition to complying with all other requirements of this title,
prepares, with respect to the site at which the disposal is proposed, a Radioactive Material Disposal Impact Assessment which shall include(A) a listing of all radioactive materials in each container to be disposed, the number of containers to be dumped, the structural diagrams
of each container, the number of curies of each material in each
container, and the exposure levels in rems at the inside and outside of
each container;
(B) an analysis of the environmental impact of the proposed action,
at the site at which the applicant desires to dispose of the material,
upon human health and welfare and marine life;
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to issuance of a permit to dispose of radioactive material, the amendment
also required a joint resolution of both Houses of Congress to authorize
the Administrator of the EPA to grant such permits.2s' Although the 1981
moratorium against dumping sewage sludge has expired, the ocean dumping of this sludge continued at an increasing rate. 05
c. U.S. Policy and Problems with the MPRSA
Although the final resolution of the dilemma involving the ocean
dumping of sewage sludge has remained unresolved, the focus of the debate has shifted dramatically since the MPRSA was enacted. 0 o A singleminded preoccupation with the threat to the ocean environment by waste
dumping 0 7 has been replaced by an approach balancing the full range of

(C) any adverse environmental effects at the site which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented;
(D) an analysis of the resulting environmental and economic conditions if the containers fail to contain the radioactive waste material
when initially deposited at the specific site;
(E) a plan for the removal or containment of the disposed nuclear
material if the container leaks or decomposes;
(F) a determination by each affected State whether the proposed
action is consistent with its approved Coastal Zone Management
Program;
(G) an analysis of the economic impact upon other users of marine
resources;
(H) alternatives to the proposed action;
(I) comments and results of consultation with State officials and
public hearings held in the coastal States that are nearest to the affected
areas;
(J) a comprehensive monitoring plan to be carried out by the applicant to determine the full effect of the disposal on the marine environment, living resources, or human health, which plan shall include, but
not be limited to, the monitoring of exterior container radiation samples, the taking of water and sediment samples, and fish and benthic
animal samples, adjacent to the containers, and the acquisition of such
other information as the Administrator may require; and
(K) such other information which the Administrator may require in
order to determine the full effects of such disposal.
Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 424(a)(i), 96 Stat. 2165-66 (1983) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1414).
204. Id. Section 424(a)(i)(4) of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 states
that:
(B) No permit may be issued by the Administrator under this chanter for the disposal of radioactive materials in the ocean unless the Congress, by approval of a resolution described in paragraph (D) within 90
days of continuous session of the Congress beginning on the date after
the date of receipt by the Senate and the House of Representatives of
such recommendation, authorizes the Administrator to grant a permit to
dispose of radioactive material under this chapter.
Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 424(a)(i)(4), 96 Stat. 2166 (1983) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1414).
205. Swanson & Devine, supra note 43, at 15.
206. See Spirer, supra note 132, at 44.
207. The concerns voiced by ocean preservationists, for the most part, have proven to
be overstated. Widespread contamination of the oceans has not been detected according to a
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environmental, social and fiscal implications in the U.S. policy regarding
ocean disposal.2 0 8 As noted by one commentator:
[cihanging environmental values, technological problems and economic pressures, scientific opinion, judicial process, and political
trends converged to change the 1970s preservationist attitudes toward
the oceans. The repercussions of this change will be significant and
long-lasting. 2°"'
More knowledge has become available regarding the ocean's (1) reaction to waste dumping, (2) resiliency, and (3) assimilative capacity. There
is also more evidence relating to the likelihood that dumping in certain
ocean areas will directly and adversely affect human health. 10 When coupled with cost considerations and court rulings, this knowledge leads
some to suggest that waste dumping decision-makers need to balance "economic tradeoffs and environmental effects of disposal on land, in the air,
or in the marine environment." " As noted by New York's Mayor Koch,
the MPRSA "is one of the few environmental statutes which recognizes
that our environment is a highly complex, interrelated system and that
waste disposal strategies involve difficult but necessary trade-offs."2 ' In
some instances, ocean dumping will become the preferred option and
must be selected with a full understanding of all the consequences. s
Ocean dumping regulators must therefore consider what materials should
be dumped in quasi-containment sites, what materials should be dispersed, and what materials should not be dumped in the oceans at all. " '
Two major problems relating to the MPRSA also need to be reviewed. The first problem involves the delimitation of authority over
ocean disposal between the EPA and the Corps which has generated interagency conflict. 1 5 Under the bifurcated system adopted by Congress,
the Corps is subjected to inherently conflicting responsibilities.2 1 6 As the
major producer of dredge spoils, the Corps regulates "activities over
which its also has operational responsibility."11 7 Prior to the enactment of
the MPRSA, the Corps had almost absolute discretion in conducting

1982 study sponsored by the United Nations Environment Programme. See CEQ 1982 REPORT, supra note 23, at 45.
208. Spirer, supra note 132, at 48.
209. Swanson & Devine, supra note 43, at 15.
210. See id. at 19.

211. Swanson & Devine, supra note 43, at 19. The "EPA has expressed the belief that
it can begin to rework all of its disposal regulations to require cross-media balancing for all
waste management decisions. NACOA supports this effort by EPA." 1982 Ocean Dumping
Hearings,supra note 21, at 295 (statement'of NACOA).
212. 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings, supra note 21, at 202-03 (statement of Edward I.
Koch).
213. Swanson & Devine, supra note 43, at 19.
214. Id.
215. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1413(c) (1976), with 33 U.S.C. § 1413(d) and § 1413(e).
216. Ocean Dumping Progress, supra note 30, at 746.

217. Id.; see Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 764.
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dredging activities.2 18 However, after passage of the MPRSA, the division
of regulatory control between the EPA and the Corps allowed both agencies to shirk their new duties.21 9 Since thoMPRSA was enacted, the EPA
has tended to promote relatively less stringent and environmentally protective criteria to govern dredged waste disposal.220 The result has been a
lax approach by the Corps toward applying the MPRSA to the ocean
22
dumping of dredge spoils. '
The second problem relating to U.S. regulation of ocean dumping activities involves unresolved scientific and management issues which include: (1) the development of a comprehensive waste disposal management strategy; and (2) the resolution of technical uncertainties to insure
that ocean disposal is pursued with minimal environmental risk. 222 The
United States has emphasized a regulatory approach which focuses on
specific disposal media and types of waste.223 Systematic assessments of
the various media (air, land, water) and of the synergistic impacts of all
disposal sources have been largely ignored. 22" Furthermore, scant consideration has been paid to the concept that some wastes should be con22 5
tained, others should be dispersed, and still others should be recycled.
To achieve a proper economic and ecological balance, the United States
needs to incorporate a more comprehensive approach toward managing
the overall problem of waste disposal;22 otherwise, too much dumping,
over too long a period, might be permitted based upon too many incorrect
assumptions.
Internationally, there are similar problems, but while the U.S. difficulty in allocating authority between the EPA vis-a-vis the Corps has led
to confusion and conflict in the United States, by comparison, the formulation of an international regulatory scheme might be unresolvable.
2. InternationalAgreements
In the area of international law, the First U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Sea, held in Geneva in 1958, resulted in four conventions,

218. Ocean Dumping Progress,supra note 30, at 746.
219. Id.
220. Id. The formal disagreement resolution procedures contained in the MPRSA
which could function to restrain Corns administration of the permit process have remained
largely ignored. As noted by one commentator the "EPA has been more of a collaborator
than an overseer of Corps activity: its reluctance to utilize statutory disagreement procedures and its promulgation of especially lax criteria has encouraged the Corps to continue
pre-Act practices." Id. at 758.
221. Id. at 746.
222. Swanson & Devine, supra note 43, at 18.
223. Id.
224. Id.

225. Id.
226. Id.; see 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings, supra note 21, at 201-02 (statement of
Edward I. Koch).

1984

OCEAN DUMPING

namely: (1) the Convention on the High Seas, 22 7 (2) the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,2 2 8 (3) the Convention on the
Continental Shelf,29 and (4) the Convention on Fishing and Conservation
of the Living Resources of the High Seas.28 0 Some of these conventions
addressed pollution issues, but methods of international enforcement and
control were quite vague and failed to abate the problems of pollution
from ocean dumping. 2 1 An explanation for that general ineffectiveness of
the early international efforts is predicated on the fact that most of these
conventions were concluded in 1958-prior to extensive scientific understanding of the actual and potential impact of dumping on the marine
23 2
environment.
In 1972, a significant contribution to international environmental law
was developed at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) held in Stockholm (Stockholm Conference). The Stockholm Conference adopted a Declaration on the Human Environment (Environment Declaration) 233 and an Action Plan.'
The Environment
Declaration called for national and international cooperation to protect
the environment and enunciated 26 basic principles.2 3 5 The first principle
of the Declaration asserted man's right to a healthy environment:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of
dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect
and improve the environment for present and future

generations .... 236
Principle 7 of the Environment Declaration urged countries to "take
all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are
liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and
marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses

227. Done Apr. 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962).
228. Done Apr. 29, 1958, [19641 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205
(entered into force Sept. 10, 1964).
229. Done Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force June 10, 1964).
230. Done Apr. 29, 1958, [19661 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (entered into force Mar. 20, 1966).
231. Waldichuk, supra note 2, at 291; see Kuersteiner, supra note 54, at 160-61. "In
fact, all that was accomplished by these conventions was an attempt to deal with the
problems of nuclear pollutants and oil discharge, both with only limited success." Kuersteiner, supra note 54, at 161 n.17.
232. Kuersteiner, supra note 54, at 161.
233. Stockholm Report, supra note 1, at 3-5.
234. Id. at 6-28. The Action Plan recommended the establishment of a global environmental assessment program (Earthwatch) and certain management activities for environmental protection. Implementation measures to support these recommendations were also
outlined. Id. at 6-34.
235. Kutner, supra note 34, at 275.
236. Stockholm Report, supra note 1, at 4.
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of the sea."2 3 7 Principle 6 called for the cessation of the release of heat

and the discharge of toxic substances "in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them harmless"23 8 (including the effects of nuclear weapons). These measures were
designed to ensure2 9 that serious or irreversible damages were not inflicted
upon ecosystems.

As a general rule, however, the issue of marine pollution was reserved
for negotiators at UNCLOS III and the IMCO Conference on Marine Pollution.2 40 Pursuant to this scheme, various national and international

meetings and developments concerning ocean dumping led to the Ocean

Dumping Conference. 241 In response to the recommendations adopted by

UNCHE, delegates to the Ocean Dumping Conference met in London
during October and November of 1972, and2 the product of this Confer24
ence was the Ocean Dumping Convention.

As the most comprehensive international agreement concerning
marine pollution (i.e., absent worldwide acceptance of the LOS Convention),2'4 3 the Ocean Dumping Convention has been praised for establishing

a list of contraband materials and for creating criteria to evaluate materials not specifically listed.4 Although the Ocean Dumping Convention acknowledged the ocean's ability to cope with limited amounts of waste, a
provision required an environmental impact analysis of potential damage
prior to dumping authorization. 24 5 In addition, the contracting States to
the Ocean Dumping Convention were obligated to: (1) promote effective
controls over all sources of marine pollution; (2) designate a permit authorization body; (3) keep records regarding the quality and quantity of
dumping by vessels and aircraft registered or situated in their territories;
and (4) negotiate dispute settlement procedures for resolving damages
24 6
caused by ocean dumping.

Criticism of the Ocean Dumping Convention has revolved primarily
around the Convention's enforcement procedures. 2

7

Contracting States

have retained authority to prevent and punish conduct which contravenes
the provisions of the Convention.2 4 1 Such an approach could conceivably
lead to the creation of "pollution havens";2 41 that is, a given country

237. Id.
238. Id.; see Kutner, supra note 34, at 275.
239. Stockholm Report, supra note 1, at 4.
240. Kindt, Prolegomenon To Marine Pulluion And The Law 0/ The
. Sea. At Oerview Of The Pollution Problem, 11 ENvTL. L. 67, 79 (1980).
241. Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 894.
242. Id.
243. Kuersteiner, supra note 54, at 162.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Kutner, supra note 34, at 273.
247. Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 895.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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could ignore illegal dumping activity or even sanction such dumping in
territorial and coastal waters to further national development policies
which were considered more important than controlling marine pollution.
Unfortunately, no specific international enforcement agency was created
by the Ocean Dumping Convention."' Vast expanses of the ocean, therefore, have remained outside international protective authority and are
subject only to the efforts of nationally supported measures. Another
weakness of the Ocean Dumping Convention involved the absence of a
method for dispute resolution.2 1
Considered as a whole, the international community has taken a
large step toward controlling pollution from ocean dumping.2 52 Yet, these
weaknesses exemplify the difficulty in creating a global regulatory
scheme. Although the Ocean Dumping Convention enhanced global
awareness, a comprehensive international agreement controlling all forms
of marine pollution would be preferable to regulate ocean dumping activities.25 The LOS Convention constitutes a significant advance in the right
direction, but the LOS Convention has fallen short in developing global
authority by generally reserving primary enforcement responsibility in
the individual countries. 2" International enforcement by IMCO would be
a preferred solution to the problem of global enforcement, particularly
since IMCO fits almost perfectly into the regime established by the LOS
Convention.
D.

Trends and Conditioning Factors

Although pollution regulation in common law countries is based primarily on statutes and conventions, case-by-case adjudication of common
law doctrines has played a limited role in the control of pollution.2 5 5 The
relevant doctrines involve court imposed tort liability and/or protection
of property rights.25 The application of common law doctrines are conditioned by a given country's attitude toward interference with property
use. The resolution of conflicting values is accomplished by balancing the
2 57
equities between the private uses and the public interests.
The common law of nuisance, for example, has been invoked in environmental litigation, but such actions have had only limited success in

250. Id. at 897.
251. Id. at 898. This deficiency was corrected by a protocol to the Convention adopted
in 1978. Ocean Dumping Convention, supra note 50, art. 11 (amended) & Appendix A.
Under this protocol, disputes may be submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
upon consent of the parties, or to arbitration, upon request of one party to the dispute. Id.
art. 11.
252. Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 898.
253. Id.
254. See LOS Convention, supra note 35, arts. 194, 210.
255. See Spirer, supra note 132, at 9.
256. See Kuner, supra note 34, at 265.
257. Id.
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abating pollution. 5 8 Courts called upon to decide nuisance suits have
often been confronted with an ex post facto polluter; that is, an enterprise whose operation commenced before its effects were considered environmentally undesirable. " 9 In such a situation, the equitable balance between eliminating the pre-existing operation and the recently recognized
pollution has been occasionally adjudicated in favor of the polluter, particularly when the continued operation of the polluter is one in which the
public has a major interest." Similarly, pollution from a multiplicity of
sources has not been obviated through nuisance litigation.2 6 Courts have
also expressed a reluctance to eliminate pollution by adopting policies
which have evolved in a piecemeal fashion. 2 ' Protracted litigation may
delay the implementation of needed public projects. Accordingly, legislation has been the preferred vehicle to regulate air, water, and noise quality standards. " 3
By comparison, litigation in the international community has played
a similarly limited role in preventing and remedying transnational pollution problems. Although case law in the international environmental area
has been sparse, certain principles have evolved regarding the resolution
of disputes and the negotiation of conventions.
The first significant international case was the Trail Smelter Arbitration,26 which was held during the 1930s to resolve a dispute over the
ore smelter operations of a Canadian corporation. The operation of the
smelter had produced sulphur dioxide fumes and damaged agricultural
and timber interests in the United States." 5 In the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the tribunal held that as a matter of international law: (1) no
country could use or permit the use of its territory in a manner causing
serious transnational injury; and (2) the country from which the pollution
originated was itself responsible even though the injury might be caused
2 66
by a private company.
The next important case delimiting international customary law with
regard to environmental hazards was the Corfu Channel Case. 26 ' This
case involved two British warships which were damaged while passing

258. Id. at 266.
259. Id. at 266-67.
260. See e.g., Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, 15 Wash.2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942).
261. Kutner. supra note 34, at 267.
262. See e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257
N.E.2d 870 (1970).
263. Kutner, supra note 34, at 268.
264. (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941); see Convention for the Settlement of Difficulties Arising From Operation of Smelter at Trail, B.C., April 15, 1935,
U.S.-Canada, 49 Stat. 3245 (1935), T.S. No. 893 (effective Aug. 7, 1935). For an overview, see
J. BARuos & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION (1974).
265. 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941); Bleicher, An Overview of InternationalEnvironmental Regulation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 19 (1972) [hereinafter cited as InternationalRegulation].
266. InternationalRegulation, supra note 265, at 25.
267. [19491 I.C.J. 4; see Wright, The Corfu Channel Case, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 491 (1949).
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through Albanian territorial waters in 1946. These ships unknowingly entered a minefield and struck mines, causing death and injury to crew
members and damage to the ships.26 s The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) stated that every country has an "obligation not to allow knowingly
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States."2 9
On the basis of this statement, an argument has been made that International law prohibits transnational environmental injury and creates liabil70
ity for environmental degradation of the oceans.1
A 1957 decision by France to divert waters from Lake Lanoux for a
2
hydroelectric project led to the Lake Lanoux Arbitration.
' Although
Spain, as a lower riparian, objected to the project, France won the arbitration because the quality and quantity of the water normally available
was unaltered and because Spain could not prove that the project would
pollute or otherwise alter the flow of water from France to Spain2 7 2 Several important international legal principles were established. First, a
country was not entitled to the unrestricted use of waters within its own
national boundaries. 2 " Secondly, the upper riparian was required to
demonstrate that there were "no adverse effects" upon the lower riparian.2 74 Thirdly, mere assertions by the upper riparian country that the
water flow and quality would remain unchanged were insufficient, and international tribunals could properly examine the scientific validity of
2 75
those claims.
The principles elucidated in these international cases have expanded
the reach of the traditional substantive basis for nuisance protection,
which allowed "a balancing of the benefits of the defendant's activities
against the damages suffered by the plaintiff. ' 276 The paucity of cases in
this area, however, has reflected the limited utility of adjudication in establishing international regulations and securing transnational compliance with measures that are protective of the environment. Considering
the magnitude of the problem involving ocean dumping and considering
the concomitant pollution problems which threaten to overwhelm the
earth's ocean, international litigation appears to be inadequate to regulate ocean dumping activities.
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Policy Alternatives and Recommendations

Only limited scientific knowledge about the long-range implication of
ocean pollution exists. For example, unanswered questions remain regarding where the radioactivity which leaks from canisters in North Atlantic
waste dumpsites is going to migrate and whether radioactive substances
are being incorporated by living organisms into the food chain.17 7 With
the proper legislative initiative and concomitant funding, this scientific
informational gap could be bridged. Unified international efforts encouraging marine scientific research are essential. While a consensus on what
the law on ocean dumping should be has emerged, a major area lacking
consensus remains with respect to international regulatory and enforcement measures. Therefore, in this section three alternative approaches for
international regulation and enforcement will be discussed. The approaches are: (1) unilateral, (2) global, and (3) regional.
Prior to the enactment of the LOS Convention, there was a void regarding international agreement on dumping control procedures (to which
a majority of nations adhered; e.g., the Ocean Dumping Convention).
This situation permitted any individual country to take selective initiatives by unilaterally extending their regulatory powers into the high seas.
Since the LOS Convention, unilateral extensions continue to occur (although generally with less frequency) when a country considers that its
vital interests are threatened by the unregulated activities of foreign nations.2
Canada's action in 1970 when it adopted the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 7 9 exemplified this type of unilateral extension.2'"
Four major criticisms are voiced by opponents to the unilateral approach. First, the oceans, as the common heritage of man, are a shared
environment used extensively for navigation. Any assumption of unilateral regulatory powers under national laws might seriously infringe upon
the utilization of this "flow resource" by other countries and peoples. 8 1
Secondly, unilateral extensions of "creeping jurisdiction" to control pollution are characterized as the most politically expedient method of extending the sovereignty of the coastal State over the high seas.2 8 2 Thirdly,
the unilateral approach is criticized because State "super programs" cannot ultimately succeed without similar efforts being exerted by neighboring countries.283 Problems would also arise with overlapping jurisdictions
and varying statutes. Finally, uses of the sea are interrelated, and each
use has..
imp.t
relating to plhutinn Tt ie acntp.d that the aim of
peaceful and efficient activities in these use areas can be realized only
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within the framework of regional cooperative agreements or international
2 84
agreements.
The second alternative approach suggested for the regulation of pollution on the high seas is a single international agency empowered to take
comprehensive measures of control. The rationale underlying the global
system is that the high seas beyond national jurisdiction are open for use
by all countries and peoples and therefore, control should be administered by the entire world community.8' s
Criticisms of this alternative revolve mainly around the centralized
character and hence immobility, of this type of agency. Most ocean pollution problems have regional peculiarities, and therefore, it is not necessary or even desirable to form a global superagency. Such an agency is
unlikely to achieve consensus on anything beyond general international
standards. Special regional problems would also generate disagreements
on the application of various detailed rules. In addition, the single global
agency would probably be too large and diverse to respond to particular
local needs.288 Only IMCO would have any possibility for being successful
in this capacity.
The third alternative, the regional approach, combines the best aspects of both- of the other two alternatives. Its focus is international in
character and yet national with regard to enforcement and implementation processes. The five major advantages of a regional approach are as
follows:
a. "[D]ifferences in the degrees and kinds of pollution in the various regions require differences in approaches to be followed in pollu2 87
tion control.
b. Regional mechanisms and organizations lead to the distribution of remedial technology in those areas where incidents may
occur.288
c. Regionalization encourages participation by a maximum number of countries, including developing countries which might otherwise remain at the periphery in a centralized system. 8 9
d. Efforts to establish and empower a single international regime have been considered futile, while unilateral measures are internationally objectionable. ' "
e. Regional organizations serve as forums for consultation and
confrontation in matters involving ocean pollution. 0'
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However, the regional approach also has its problems. If a regional
organization lacks an international character, it may not be able to invoke
sanctions against flag States with differing ideological values.292 Another
problem area deals with the region's potential lack of a unified and coordinated effort. If the regional authority is fragmented in its scope, or selfinterested in its focus, overall goals may be difficult to legislate and pursue for the good of the entire international community.
However, these problems can be overcome. The advantages of a regional system far outweigh the disadvantages. A regional approach will
allow various nations the cooperative freedom to regulate and enforce legislation concerning ocean dumping, and yet, this approach will still permit coordinated domestic legislation over both coastal and international
dumping in waterways, without ignoring the interests of the high
seas-which fall under no one sovereign's jurisdiction.

III.

THE LAW OF THE SEA PROVISIONS

The function of the international law of the sea is constitutional: it
creates the basic system of order in the oceans. It is primarily concerned with allocating rights to use the oceans, and rights to insist
that one's 2interests
be taken duly into account in the exercise of rights
9
by others. 3
The LOS Convention establishes and codifies new duties to protect and
preserve the marine environment.2 94 In general, elaborate provisions
"both expand environmental rights and obligations and limit certain unilateral environmental actions '295 which may impair other use values. Additional duties recognized by the LOS Convention focus on the promotion
of marine scientific research and dissemination of scientific knowledge. 2"
An analysis of the pertinent provisions follows.
Pursuant to part XII, section 1, of the LOS Convention, countries
have a general obligation to: (1) "protect and preserve the marine environment"; 97 (2) "take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures
consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment from any source, using for
this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities, ... ;298 and (3) "take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so
conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their

292. See id. at 20.
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"I299In addition, States are cautioned that their polluenvironment,..
tion control efforts should not "transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or
hazards from one area to another or transform one type of pollution into
another."' 0 Three types of qualifications, however, limit these duties.
The first qualification of a country's legal obligations is found in the
language "pursuant to their environmental policies" of article 193.01 Although this text was designed to provide countries with flexibility regarding their environmental programs, the context of its adoption is related to
the remaining qualifications.302 The second qualification reserves to nations "the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to
their environmental policies and in accordance with their duty to protect

and preserve the marine environment.

3 03

This text, while preserving a

country's right to the flexible development and management of its resources, conditions the exercise of this right on environmental considerations. 304 This textual approach attempts to harmonize competing economic and environmental interests which may effectively undermine the
latter. 8°5 The third qualification makes the legal obligation of countries to
prevent and control pollution dependent upon their "ability to discharge
that obligation" and with regard to their "stage of economic development."306 For most developing countries, this qualification renders their
30 7
obligation illusory.
Part XII, section 2, of the LOS Convention obligates nations to: (1)
cooperate on a global and regional basis with international organizations
to formulate "international rules, standards and recommended practices
and procedures . . . for the protection and preservation of the marine

environment";30 8 (2) cooperate in the promotion of scientific research and
data exchange programs regarding marine pollution; 0 " (3) cooperate "in
eliminating the effects of pollution and preventing or minimizing the
damage"; 1 0 and (4) establish appropriate scientific criteria for the formulation of international environmental "rules, standards and recommended
311
practices and procedures for the prevention, reduction and control" of
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marine pollution.
Section 3 of Part XII contains broad provisions for the promotion of
"scientific, educational, technical and other assistance to developing
States for the protection and preservation of the marine environment and
the prevention . . . of marine pollution."3 2 Such assistance would be
deemed essential to any global effort to reduce and regulate marine pollution problems. Under Section 4, countries are obligated "to observe, measure, evaluate and analyse, by recognized scientific methods, the risks or
effects of pollution of the marine environment, ' 31 3 and to "keep under
surveillance the effects of any activities which they permit or in which
they engage in order to determine whether these activities are likely to
pollute the marine environment.3 1 1 4 Section 5 imposes a reporting obligation on countries 316 and requires that they assess the potential effects of
activities under their jurisdiction which "may cause substantial pollution
of or significant and harmful changes to the marine environment. 31 6 The
wide-ranging scope of these provisions recognizes the need for internationally binding standards and obligations regarding the marine environment. The LOS Convention also focuses on source-specific pollution in its
attempt to protect and preserve the marine environment.
In addition to land-based pollution and air-borne pollution, the third
major type of pollution to be minimized under article 194, paragraph 3, of
the LOS Convention is dumping. 3 Land-based pollution, air-borne pollution, and dumping appear to have been grouped together in paragraph
3, subsection (a), 33 8 because they constitute some of the earliest forms of
marine pollution and because they were already well-established types of
pollution when UNCLOS III was first convened in 1974. By comparison,
the newer types of marine pollution, i.e., vessel-source pollution and pollution from seabed activities, have been delimited within separate subsections 19 and more provisions of the LOS Convention have been directed
toward them. 320 In any event, article 194 imposes a basic duty upon countries to minimize "dumping." 2' 1
As previously indicated, the word "dumping" is basically defined in
article 1, paragraph 1(5)(a)(i) as "any deliberate disposal of wastes or
other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea . . ."" Thus, although the word "dumping" is used, the
more popular term of "ocean dumping" is entirely appropriate, because
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what is meant is the deliberate disposal of wastes at sea. It should also be
noted that the primary test continues to be one of "intent"-as evidenced
by the use of the words "deliberate disposal."
Considerable attention has been directed toward defining what is not
included within the concept of "dumping," particularly since more wordage is directed toward what does not constitute dumping vis-a-vis what
does constitute dumping. 3 Article 1, paragraph 1(5)(b) excludes wastes
incidental to the "normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or

other man-made structures . .

."324

from the definition of "dumping."

Such incidental wastes are governed by other provisions of the LOS Convention. Similar to the intent test for what constitutes dumping, the test
of what does not constitute dumping focuses on "purpose"3 25 (i.e., intent).
It can be argued that the establishment of offshore waste disposal facilities appears to be prohibited by article 1, paragraph 1(5)(b)(i), 32 since
under this provision such activities would constitute "dumping." Whether
the waste disposal installations mentioned in this section are to be
treated as "offshore installations" or as structures engaged in "dumping"
needs to be clarified.
Within the specific provisions covering marine pollution, article 210
governs dumping.3 2 7 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 210 obligate countries
to adopt laws, regulations, and other measures "to prevent, reduce and
control" dumping. 328 These obligations are similar to those adopted for
other types of marine pollution, but paragraph 3 appears to add an additional obligation for countries to monitor their industries to ensure that
illegal dumping does not occur.3 2 9 Paragraph 4 tends to place emphasis on
utilizing an international approach toward controlling dumping, 3 0 and
the crucial problems regarding ocean dumping seem to involve areas that
lie beyond coastal-State jurisdiction.3 1
Given the hypersensitive nature of certain ocean regions and of the
marine environment in general, an overall prohibition against ocean
dumping would intrinsically be the preferable approach. The option
adopted by the Ocean Dumping Convention, however, regulates rather
than prohibits waste disposal in the seas. The eventual trend toward accomplishing a regulatory scheme which protects the ocean is evidenced by
the fact that coastal-State permission is a prerequisite under article 210,
paragraph 5 of the LOS Convention before dumping can occur in territo-
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rial seas, in economic zones, or on the continental shelves.'32 This paragraph effectively prohibits dumping without permission in one-third of
the world's oceans. By obligating countries to utilize measures which are
"no less effective" than "global rules and standards," 333 paragraph 6 affirms this viewpoint. In the interim, the practical use of a regional approach is supported by paragraph 4 and by the "geographical situation"
requirement of paragraph 5.334
"Enforcement" with respect to dumping33 is governed by article 216.
Both national laws established in accordance with the LOS Convention
and international standards established through competent international
organizations (such as IMCO) shall be enforced:
(a) by the coastal State with regard to dumping within its territorial sea or its exclusive economic zone or onto its continental shelf;
(b) by the flag State 33
with regard to vessels flying its flag or vessels
or aircraft of its registry;
(c) by any State with regard to acts of loading of wastes or other
3 7
matter occurring within its territory or at its off-shore terminals. 1
These provisions would appear to require international acceptance of
the Ocean Dumping Convention because the Convention constitutes a
pre-existing, widely-accepted agreement established through a competent
diplomatic conference. " 8 Therefore, under the LOS Convention, coastal
States would be obligated to enforce the precepts of the Ocean Dumping
Convention in their territorial seas, economic zones, and continental shelf
areas. As indicated earlier, the area covered by the protective umbrella of
this provision only constitutes one-third of the oceans. Critics contend
that the LOS Convention provisions for enforcement are decidedly vague
and do not extend beyond those jurisdictional limitations to which the
international community bound itself in the Ocean Dumping Convention.38 9 Thus, the LOS Convention's enforcement efforts fall short of a
genuine, internationally based attempt "to clean up the ocean, or prevent
3' 40
it from getting considerably dirtier.
Even if a country absolutely prohibits ocean dumping of wastes,
problems will persist. If coastal States rigidly enforce the Ocean Dumping
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Convention in the coastal areas, those parties wishing to continue dumping will necessarily be forced out into the high seas areas. Thus, pollution
problems would be merely transferred, not remedied. Although most of
the high seas areas are biological deserts, any dumping would, by definition, almost invariably result in wastes sinking below the thermocline and
thereby affecting hypersensitive ecological areas. Accordingly, ocean
dumping should be strictly regulated throughout the oceans-not just in
the coastal areas.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A prohibition on ocean dumping which is too rigid is neither wise nor
practical. Studies by the scientific community have revealed that marine
ecosystems can be sufficiently safeguarded from pollution if ocean dumping involves biodegradable and nonaccumulative waste materials. However, increased scientific and regulatory attention should be directed toward identifying the conditions under which other wastes can be dumped
without causing environmental damage. The lack of empirical base data,
when coupled with reduced funding for oceanic research, will not further
an intelligent analysis of dumping disposal options.
A "multimedia approach" to waste management may avoid the transfer of pollution problems from one medium to another. The balancing of
relative harms and costs appears economically attractive but may lead to
the overemphasis of cost considerations. The focus on "management"
considerations may lead to short-term disposal decisions which ignore the
long-term consequences of ocean dumping. Those who would subsidize
industrial operations by selecting the "cheapest" disposal option (i.e., the
ocean), "ought to bear the burden of proof that no irreversible damage
will result now, or in the future."34' 1 A presumption against ocean dumping could further spur the development of new technologies for processing
wastes.
The environmental and political vulnerability of the ocean necessitates regulatory vigilance. Caution and prudence are justified by the limited knowledge which society possesses regarding the assimilative capacity of the seas. Ocean dumped wastes know no political boundaries and
represent a threat to the entire global community. Unilateral extensions
of jurisdiction should be discouraged. The example of the MPRSA highlights not only the potential interaction between national and international regulatory schemes but also the sacrifice of the marine environment by a country in furtherance of political expediency. International
attempts to protect and preserve the marine environment need to be
more fully developed. The Ocean Dumping Convention represented a
positive attempt in this direction. Although the LOS Convention did not
sufficiently capitalize upon the international regulatory gains made by the
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Ocean Dumping Convention, the LOS Convention has expanded the substantive duties of countries to guard the marine environment from damage via ocean dumping. Through the LOS Convention, more countries
will become bound to the precepts of the Ocean Dumping Convention.
International enforcement mechanisms remain deficient under the
LOS Convention, which generally abdicated enforcement responsibility to
the individual nations. Although the jurisdictional authority of coastal
States was expanded to include the economic zone (EEZ), vast expanses
of the ocean theoretically remain unprotected. A single international regulatory body, such as IMCO, should not be deemed the only solution. A
viable alternative would vest dumping control in regionally-based regulatory authorities. Adoption of the LOS Convention need not be interpreted to preclude regional cooperation. In fact, the regional approach
appears to be the best approach for regulating ocean dumping. Even so,
countries should remember that it is necessary to explore all avenues
which would protect and preserve the marine environment.

